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Audit expectations gap (AEG) is one of the most debated phenomena animating the international scientific 
research scene. The volume of papers focused on defining the AEG concept, examining its determinants, 
implications, and mechanisms to minimize the gap almost exceeds those dedicated to the exploration of 
creative  accounting.  Our  paper,  as  an  integral  part  of  a  wider  research
450,  seeks  to  review  the 
conceptualization of AEG on international arena along with its identified determinants and behavioral 
path, and the research methodologies employed by researchers in their studies on AEG. Our approach 
relies heavily on an extensive international literature review, based on which we conclude with taxonomy 
on AEG.  
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Introduction 
Under the circumstances of current international developments, dominated by financial crises, the 
traditional role  played  by  the  external audit  in rendering  confidence  in  companies‘ financial 
reporting  on  their  financial  position  and  performances  is  increasingly  becoming  questioned. 
Limperg (1932 cited in Porter et al 2005 p.119) points out that the “audit function is rooted in the 
confidence  that  society  places  in  the  effectiveness  of  the  audit  and  in  the  opinion  of  the 
accountant…if  the  confidence  is  betrayed,  the  function,  too,  is  destroyed,  since  it  becomes 
useless”. Confused by economic crises, the public turn its eyes on auditors: Why auditors do not 
report the frauds committed by his clients? To what extent should an auditor be invested with 
confidence since it gets paid by its client? How reliable and useful could be an audit report if 
ambiguous wording is extensively used in it? If auditors are not able to explain intelligibly their 
work, how could one expect that non-auditors would understand it? (Humphrey, 1997). Why 
auditors  do  not  disclose  creative  accounting  techniques  used  by  their  clients?  Why  financial 
failures are invariably showing up auditors‘ tolerance to manipulations of financial information 
by their clients? Concluding on such questions, and many others not captured above, perhaps, the 
most serious perception widely shared by the public that undermines the external audit – drawn 
from the audit‘ inability to early signal and disclose the corporate failures – is: why is external 
auditing compulsory to companies? (Manuzi, 2008).  
Looking in the past, one could notice that this is a cyclical phenomenon: whenever the economic 
world is shaken by financial scandals or is going through financial crises, external auditing is 
exposed to wide public criticisms which do not save any effort to question on its role (Humphrey, 
1997).  Accumulated in time, such noisy voices have placed a strong pressure on the international 
professional  community  to  react  in  various  ways:  either  by  adjusting  some  professional 
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standards, by issuing new ones, by promoting higher publicity about the external audit mission, 
or by internationally emphasizing the auditing role. While until recently such actions were taken 
individually,  anticipating  the  threats  faced  by  the  profession,  the  international  regulation 
community joined their efforts to support each other in passing through the economic crises and 
in promoting the utility of external auditing (Manuzi, 2008). Whether such an approach would 
trigger the desired effects or not is another controversial issue. However, looking at the past 
developments of public perceptions toward auditing, irrespective of arguments brought by each 
side, the picture gets clearer: the gap has never narrowed, but deepened and got versatile.  
Noticing  the  perception  gap  and  pragmatic  actions  undertaken  the  international  scientific 
community has initiated an extensive research on AEG resulting in an explosion of papers written 
and published by famous researchers. Being confident that one cannot treat effectively the effects 
until  the  causes  are  known,  a  large  number  of  papers  approach  the  determinants  of  AEG 
attempting to explain it. For instance, issues such as principles and concepts of auditing, audit 
role and functions, techniques and procedures, communication and auditor‘s responsibility, and 
professional ethics – virtually, all of them – have been considered as generating and explanatory 
determinants of AEG. At the same time, a limited amount of research was dedicated to exploring 
the social and cultural foundations of AEG emphasizing the auditor‘s professional conduct and 
the limited public efforts – as users of audit reports – to obtain a good understanding about the 
audit mission and role. From this perspective, the gap can not be covered as long as human 
imperfections and behaviors of both sides are considered. Apart from theoretical debates, it is a 
separate issue whether the researchers‘ findings serve to narrow the gap, or are employed in this 
process by the profession, that could be addressed by further research.  However, the scientific 
community is to be highly praised for its research efforts resulting in the formulation of the AEG 
paradigm and for the exposure of virtually unlimited scientific approaches to auditing issues.  
 
1. Conceptualization of AEG in international literature 
1.1. AEG definitions 
In line with the various approaches briefly indicated above, there are a number of attempts to 
define the AEG. Within this paragraph we have selected some of the most relevant definitions.  
Liggio (1974) defined the audit expectations gap as the difference between the levels of expected 
performance as interpreted by the independent accountant and the user of financial statements. 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Flint (1988), Wallace (1980) – to name only few researchers – have 
their merits for describing the AEG in terms of audit‘s role and usefulness employing the agency, 
assurance, information, and market utility theories. But, beyond of the scientific and pragmatic 
value of their arguments, it was obvious that they were pleading for the profession; somehow 
they implied that the public – as improper educated users of audited financial reports – is to be 
blamed for its misperceptions on audit role and importance.  
Toward the end of the last century, more balanced views showed up: the auditors and their 
responsibilities  began  to  be  considered  within the  definition  of  the  AEG. Thus,  a  couple  of 
decades later, Porter noticed that the concept of auditor‟s expected performance from Liggio‘s 
definition was too vague which ignores that auditors, as human beings, do not always behave as 
prescribed by the professional standards. Consequently, she pointed out that AEG reflects the 
society's expectations of auditors against the perceived performance of auditors (Porter, 1993). In 
line with Porter‘s arguments, Humphrey, Moizer and Turley (1993) suggest that the common 
element in the various definitions of the gap is that auditors are performing in a manner that is at 
variance  with  the  beliefs  and  desires  of  others  who  are  party  to  or  interested  in  the  audit. 
Chandler and Edwards (1996) define AEG as the differences between what the public expects 
from an audit and what the auditing profession prefers the audit objectives to be. According to 
Pierce  and  Kilcommins  (1996),  the  audit  expectations  gap  is  when  external  auditors' 
understanding of their role and duties is compared against the expectations of user groups and the 908 
 
general public. Koh (1998) suggests that AEG gives rise when auditors and the public hold 
different beliefs about the auditors‘ duties and responsibilities and the messages conveyed by 
audit  reports.  Marianne  Ojo  (2006)  defines  AEG  as  “the  difference  between  what  users  of 
financial statements, the general public perceive an audit to be and what the audit profession 
claim is expected of them in conducting an audit. In this respect, it is important to distinguish 
between the audit profession's expectations of an audit on one hand, and the auditor's perception 
of the audit on the other hand”. One of the most popular internet definitions of AEG marks the 
discrepancy between expectations of the end-of-year procedure addressees and the actual legal 
order and contents of the annual audit. The more strongly expectations of the public of the actual 
task  of  the  final  examination  deviate,  the  less  the  work  of  the  accountants  reliable  are 
considered
451.  
 
1.2. AEG determinants and its behavioral path 
The  diversity  of  AEG  definitions  is  directly  linked  to  the  wide  range  of  its  determinants 
considered by researchers (Dobroţeanu et al, 2007). There is an impressive amount of papers 
discussing the attitudes and users behavior as regards the auditors‘ responsibilities with respect to 
frauds – by far, this is the most controversial and vivid subject of the past and current debates. It 
is true that, originally, auditing played a primary role in controlling the businesses while such a 
role implied detection of frauds. However, as businesses have developed globally, at a rapid pace, 
the audit‘s role has evolved consequently, leaving the business control and fraud detection in the 
hands  of  some  other  organizational  functions  (Dobroţeanu  L,  Dobroţeanu  C,  2002). 
Unfortunately, the public way of thinking and its level of education have not kept the pace with 
such  developments  but  rather  they  remained  anchored  in  the  traditional  role  of  auditing, 
expecting the auditors to continue to be responsible for fraud detection and disclosure (Shaked, 
Sutton, 1982). Often, under the pressures of public criticisms – as the accordion movements – the 
profession‘s regulators tried to accommodate the auditing practice to public desires, although 
such attempts have repeatedly failed. Among the arguments brought by the profession were the 
lack of professional expertise required by fraud detection and the obligation of auditors to comply 
with  ethical  provisions,  namely  to  observe  the  confidentiality  principle  during  their  audit 
engagements. The proverbial hot potato changing hands frequently has been quickly discarded by 
auditors, even though in parallel, some audit and consultancy companies were advertising their 
consulting  services  for  fraud  prevention  and  detection!  (Humphrey,  1997).  The  current 
international standard of auditing – ISA 240 – introduces certain subtle provisions in presenting 
the  auditors  responsibilities  in  relation  to  fraud:  when  planning  and  conducting  the  audit 
engagement, the auditor has to consider the risk of fraud. According to Lee and Azham, 2008 
often, the public looses sight of such subtle wording.  
Perhaps, as much debated as fraud-auditor relationship, if not even more in quantitative terms, 
the auditors‘ independence give rise to a wide range of suspicions of financial statements users. 
Generally speaking, their concerns related to auditor‘s lack of independence – based on which the 
reliability of financial reports is hindered – are driven by the equivoque procedure of engaging 
and  rendering  accountability  to  auditors.  If,  as  indicated  within  the  IFAC‘s  conceptual 
framework, the auditor serves the public interest, why are they employed and paid by the client? 
Why then the target user of audit reports is the shareholder instead of the public? 
Another way of looking at the lack of auditor independence in public‘s perception is to consider 
the conflict of interests triggered by providing non-audit services to the audit client. In spite of 
the efforts made by the international professional community to disseminate widely the actions 
taken to strengthen the auditor‘s independence, public‘s perceptions seem to remain unchanged. 
Such an attitude is fueled by the fact that auditors themselves, though an insignificant minority, 
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seem to not value too much the professional ethics, particularly the independence in appearance 
(Leung et al, 2007).  
Some papers examine the users‘ perceptions in relation with the utility of the audit report (e.g. 
Monroe, Woodliff, 2009). There are different views on and preferences for long- and short-form 
of  the  audit  report.  However,  irrespective  of  users‘  preferences,  such  papers  point  out  the 
ambiguous wording used by auditors in audit reports as a major cause for AEG. Several studies 
envisaged users‘ propensity to perceive the audit opinion as a 100% guarantee of the accuracy of 
financial reports issued by companies (Epstein, Geiger, 1994). The reasonable assurance is not 
perceived by the public as expected to be. The heavy use of equivoque and subjective concepts 
such as true and fair, materiality, professional judgment, etc. is one of the major impediments in 
rendering audit report with intelligibility, and in setting up an efficient communication channel 
between  the  auditor  and  the  users  of  financial  reports.  In  consistence  with  its  tradition,  the 
profession repeatedly has declined to accommodate its practices to the users‘ perceptions which 
trigger further public criticisms. According to Hopwood (1990, cited by Humphrey, 1997), to 
describe in detail audit techniques sufficiently enough to be understandable to the wide public, 
would  blow  up  the  whole  mystery  surrounding  auditors‘  activities  and  disclose  the  mystical 
qualities of professional expertise and judgment. In such circumstances, it is straightforward that 
none of the disputing groups is making any efforts to alleviate the gap, but rather this leads to a 
further gap widening. 
To some extent in line with the determinants described above, several papers approach the AEG 
by discussing the audit function from a more pragmatic perspective. Such studies have tried to 
find  explanations  for  AEG  by  approaching  the  public  misperceptions,  often  exaggerated,  as 
regards the utility of auditing and the manner of conducting an audit engagement (Lee, Azham, 
2008). First of all, the excessive publicity of corporate failures associated with auditors‘ name, 
rarely completely justified – see, for example, Enron-Arthur Andersen case – has triggered a 
serious  credibility  and  image  problems  for  the  profession  (Hourguebie  (2004)  cited  by  Lee, 
Azham,  2008).  In  spite  of  considerable  efforts  made  by  the  profession  to  regain  the  public 
confidence, the public perceptions remained anchored in these pseudo-realities. The public seem 
to prefer to act following the rule: it is easier to blame and criticize than to learn and understand. 
What seems to be unfair is that there is no publicity surrounding corporate successes labeled with 
auditors‘ name! The major public accusations underline the audit inability to act like an early 
warning system against corporate failure prospective. Such perceptions are often based on the 
assumption that auditors do not comply with professional standards in conducting their audit 
engagements due to their lack of expertise or deficient auditing standards allowing auditors to 
supersede their provisions or due to ambiguous concepts that trace auditors‘ activities leaving 
enough room for maneuver to manipulate the audit results. In line with the above described 
public perceptions, there are some papers that discuss the negative implications on the auditors‘ 
professional conduct triggered by the compulsory auditing imposed to companies through legal 
requirements (Boon et. al, 2008). According to these views (Manuzi, 2008), the auditors are 
protected by the legal provisions and seem to not be motivated to secure their market: their 
clients can not give up to auditing: they only have the option to change an auditor for another 
one. Such circumstances render the auditors with a very comfortable position in considering the 
accommodation  of  public  expectations  related  to  their  performances.  Finally,  a  number  of 
criticisms envisaged the superficial controls conducted over the auditors activities (. The attempts 
to solve these problems by strengthening the quality control mechanisms together with setting up 
the so-called independent supervisory bodies raise also a lot of questions.  
 
2. The taxonomy and research methods for exploring AEG 
The detailed review of relevant literature circumscribed to AEG controversy give the grounds for 
classifying  the  scientific  approaches  into  several  major  groups  taking  into  consideration  the 910 
 
determinants of AEG tracing its behavioral path (CICA, 1988; Porter, 1991). A first group of 
approaches  –  known  as  performance  gap  –  consist  of  research  papers  that  examine  AEG 
determinants  focusing  on  cases  when  the  society‘s  reasonable  expectations  of  auditors‘ 
accomplishments  fall  short  of  their  perception  of  auditors‘  achievement.  This  group  can  be 
further broken down into two representative subgroups (Al-Duneibat, 2003): deficient standards 
(gap between duties reasonably expected of auditors and auditors‘ existing duties as defined by 
the law and professional promulgations),  and deficient performance (gap between the expected 
standard  of  performance  of  auditors‘  existing  duties  and  auditors‘  perceived  performance). 
Complementary, one could distinguish studies that investigate AEG from the perspective when 
the society‘s expectations of auditors exceed the duties reasonably expected of auditors. This 
group is known as ignorance/feasibility/reasonableness gap.  
The articles written on AEG reveal a continuous diversification of research in this field: from a 
simple literature review, to empirical studies with valuable scientific outcomes. In addition, there 
are papers
452 that seek to test various theories and hypothesis on AEG at national/regional levels. 
In spite of the impressive volume of published research, one could notice that there are a limited 
number of studies exploring the psychological, cultural or political factors that could explain 
certain attitudes, behaviors or perceptions toward auditing (Sikka, 1998; Al-Duneibat, 2003). 
The research methodologies employed by these studies are basically those belonging to s ocial 
sciences. Thus, there is a heavy use of empirical research based on structured or semi -structured 
interviews and questionnaires, particularly in cases of examining the performance gap. The 
subjects of empirical studies continue to be diversified: fro m students to auditors, investors, 
brokers, regulatory bodies officials or representatives of corporate governance structures from 
companies. Although in a limited number, there are several studies that employ positive research 
methods, particularly to anticipate the forthcoming developments of AEG, based on statistical 
observations captured within econometrical models. An illustrative example in this regard, would 
indicate those papers that explore the AEG from the investors‘ perception perspective, while the 
benchmark most often considered is the relation between the stock performances and auditors‘ 
opinion (Antle et al, 1997, 2002; Teoh and Wong, 1993). 
 
Concluding remarks 
A comprehensive literature review on AEG offers an amount of unexpected valuable information 
and precludes the researcher from the risk to get trapped into reinventing the wheel. Pros and 
cons that  are  brought  in debating  AEG  are also  useful  in tracing  our  objective  judgment  in 
conducting this study. The major outcomes reveal that AEG is an endless topic for scientific 
research  that  might  be  further explored  through  multiple  research  methods.  Narrowing  AEG 
through more or less sophisticated mechanisms could be viewed as a utopia, since, as accounting 
creativity, AEG is a natural phenomenon, an engine – though with a slow start up – which moves 
forward the audit theories and practice. The best that one might expect by using such mechanisms 
is to control and alleviate the negative or … undesired implications over the profession.  
 
Selected references: 
1. Adams, C., Evans, R., Accountability, Completeness, Credibility and the Audit Expectations 
Gap, JCC 14 Summer 2004, Greenleaf Publishing, p. 97-115. 
2. Al-Duneibat, A., Structure and causes of the audit expectation gap: evidence from Jordan, 
DERASAT-Managerial Sciences, vol. 30, no. 1, 2003. 
3. Antle, R., Gordon, E.A., Narayanamoorthy, G., Zhou, L., The joint determination of audit fees, 
non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals, Working paper, 2002, Yale University. 
                                                       
452  See for example Porter (1993) in New Zealand; Porter and Gowthorpe (2004) in the UK and Lee et al. (2007) in 
Malaysia. 911 
 
4.  Antle,  R.,  Griffin,  P.,  Teece,  D.,  Williamson,  O.,  An  economic  analysis  of  auditor‘ 
independence for a multi-client, multi-service public accounting firm, Serving the Public Interest: 
A  New  Conceptual  Framework  for  Auditor  Independence,  October  1997,  Independence 
Standards Board, AICPA. 
5.  Bostick,  L.  N.,    Minimizing  the  expectation  gap,  Academy  of  Accounting  and  Financial 
Studies Journal, www.FindArticles.com. April, 2009. 
6.  Boon,  K.,  McKinnon,  J.,  Ross,  P.,  Audit  service  quality  in  compulsory  audit  tendering: 
preparer perceptions and satisfaction, Accounting Research Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, 2008, p. 93-
122.   
7. Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Report of The Commission to Study the Public‘s 
Expectations of Audits, Toronto: CICA, 1988. 
8.  Chandler,  R.,  Edwards,  J.  (1996),  A  Recurring  Issues  in  Auditing:  Back  to  the  Future?, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol. 9, no. 2, p.4-29. 
9.  Dobroţeanu  L,  Dobroţeanu  C.L.,  Audit:  concepte  şi  practici.  O  abordare  naţională  şi 
internaţională, Editura Economică, 2002. 
10. Dobroţeanu, L., Dobroţeanu, C.L., Stanciu, L.,  Ciolpan, D., Burilescu, A., Audit: studii şi 
cercetări, Editura InfoMega, 2007. 
11. Epstein, M. J., Geiger, M.A, Investor Views of Audit Assurance: Recent Evidence of the 
Expectation Gap, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 177, 1994 
12. Flint, D., Philosophy and principles of auditing. An Introduction, 1988. 
13. Humphrey, C.,  Debating Audit Expectations, Current Issues in Auditing, 1997, p. 3-31. 
14. Humphrey, C., Moizer, P., Turley, W., The audit expectation gap in Britain: an empirical 
investigation, Accounting and Business Research, vol 23., 1993, p. 395-411.  
15. Koh, H.C., Woo, E.S.,  The expectation gap in auditing, Managerial Auditing Journal, vol. 
13, no. 3, 1998, p. 147-154.  
16. Lee, T.H., Gloeck, J.D., Palaniappan, A.K., The audit expectation gap: an empirical study in 
Malaysia, Southern African Journal of Accountability and Auditing Research, vol 7, 2007, p.1-
15. 
16. Lee, T.H., Azham Md. A., The audit expectation gap: A review of the contributing factors, 
Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, Vol. 4, No.8 (Serial No.39), Aug. 2008, p. 30-37 
17. Leung, P., Coram, P., Cooper, B., Modern Auditing & Assurance Service (3rd ed.), John 
Wiley &Sons, 2007 
18. Liggio, C. D., The Expectation Gap, The Accountant's Waterloo, Journal of Contemporary 
Business, vol. 3, 1974, p. 27.  
19. Manuzi, M., Provocări europene pentru profesie, Audit Financiar no. 12, 2008.  
20. Mautz, R.K, Sharaf, H.A., The philosophy of auditing, 1961. 
21. Mohammad Hudaib, Ros Haniffa, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Perceptions Gap in 
Saudi  Arabia,  Paper  number  02/03,  http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/accounting/papers/0203.pdf 
22.  Monroe,  G.S.,  Woodliff,  D.R.,  An  empirical  investigation  of  the  audit  expectation  gap: 
Australian evidence, Accounting and Finance, vol. 34, no.1, 2009, p. 47-74.  
23. Ojo, M.,  Eliminating the Audit Expectations Gap : Myth or Reality?, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/232/, 2006.  
24. Pierce, B.,  Kilcommins, M., The Audit Expectations Gap: The Role of Auditing Education 
Dublin City University Business School Research Papers no. 13, 1995-1996.  
25. Porter, B., An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation – Performance Gap, Accounting and 
Business Research, vol. 24 no. 93, 1993, p. 49-68. 
26.  Porter,  B.,  Narrowing  the  Audit  Expectations  –  Performance  Gap:  A  Contemporary 
Approach, Pacific Accounting Review, no. 3(1), June 1991, p.1-36. 912 
 
27. Porter, B., Gowthorpe, C., Audit expectation-performance gap in the United Kingdom in 
1999 and comparison with the Gap in New Zealand in 1989 and in 1999, ICAS, 2004. 
28.  Sikka,  P.,  Puxty,  A.,  Willmott,  H.,  Cooper,  C.,  The  Impossibility  of  Eliminating  the 
Expectations Gap: Some Theory and Evidence, Critical Perspectives on Accounting no. 9, 1998, 
pp. 299-330. 
 -  Shaked,  A.,  Sutton,  J.,  Imperfect  information,  perceived  quality  and  the  formation  of 
professional groups, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, p. 170-181. 
29. Teoh, S.H., Wong, T.J., Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient, The 
Accounting Review, April 1993, p. 346-367. 
30. Wallace, W.A., The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets, University of 
Rochester, New York, 1980. 